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Sammendrag 
I en artikkel tidsskriftet International Tax and Public Finance fant Bas Jacobs at marginalkostnaden for 
skattefinansiering av kollektive offentlige goder (MCF) er én. Denne konklusjonen bygger på en 
kritikk av standarddefinisjonen av MCF, for eksempel at størrelsen og fortegnet på standard MCF-mål 
er følsomt for valget av det ubeskattede godet. Jacobs anvender derfor en mindre vanlig definisjon av 
MCF. Hvis lump-sum-skatter er en marginal kilde for offentlig finansiering og beskatningen er 
optimal, er MCF én med den anvendte definisjonen. Det foreliggende arbeidet har to hovedfunn. For 
det første finner jeg at standard MCF-mål ikke er følsomt for valg av ubeskattet gode, slik Jacobs 
hevder. For det andre finner jeg at den foreslåtte alternative definisjonen av MCF anvendt av Jacobs 
har uønskede egenskaper, for eksempel at den kan gi negative MCF-verdier langs den stigende delen 
av Laffer-kurven og er følsom overfor valget av ubeskattet gode også i tilfeller der dette ikke gir 
mening. Jeg konkluderer med at det ikke er grunnlag for å hevde MCF er én. 
1 Introduction
Jacobs (2018) challenges previous research on the question of possible costs of tax-
ation and the question of optimal supply of tax-funded public goods. If the con-
clusions in Jacobs (2018) are confirmed by further research, they have important
consequences. Accordingly, influenced by Jacobs’ analyses the Dutch government
recently decided to set the marginal cost of public funds to one in cost benefit
analyses of public projects.
The present paper is mainly a follow up to Jacobs (2018) and questions his
conclusions. Different definitions of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) will
be discussed. It is therefore reasonable to begin with a brief overview of some
important contributions to the literature on this issue.
Due to the limited possibilities for use of lump-sum taxes and likely efficiency
losses from other taxes, Pigou (1947, p. 34) concluded that public expenditure
ought not to be carried out so far as to make the real yield of the last unit of re-
sources expended by the government equal to the real yield of the last unit left in
the hands of the representative citizen. In other words, Pigou concluded that the
traditional rule for optimal allocation of resources between private and public sec-
tor, later formalized by Samuelson (1954), would give too much public expenditure
(Diamond & Mirrlees, 1971).
Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) and Atkinson and Stern (1974) made it clear
that this is not necessarily correct. The reason is that a tax increase has both
a substitution effect and an income effect. The substitution effect draws in the
direction of reduced labour supply. This creates an unintended distortion and
represents a cost of taxation. In addition, a tax increase has an income effect.
Reduced after-tax-income makes individuals increase their labour supply if leisure
is a normal good. Increased labour supply will represent an efficiency gain if there
already is a tax on labour income which has caused an inefficiently low supply of
labour. If the income effect exceeds the substitution effect, the tax increase gives
an efficiency improvement which means that the marginal cost of public funds
(MCF) is less than one.
Accordingly, Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) found that ”whether the conven-
tional rule represents an under or over supply depends simply on whether the
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supply of labour is backward bending or upward sloping.”
Neither Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) or Atkinson and Stern (1974) used the
term MCF. Their articles have nevertheless been considered as the starting point
for what today is the standard definition of MCF. Hence, since the publication
of these two contributions it has been clear that MCF could be smaller than one
even when distortionary taxes are the marginal source of public funding. Possible
confusion caused by this conclusion was discussed by Ballard and Fullerton (1992),
who explained clearly why this conclusion, which perhaps might be considered a
paradox, makes sense, see also H˚akonsen (1998) who compared different defintions
of MCF.
Because its effects on income distribution is an important aspect of the design
of tax schemes, an important contribution by Sandmo (1998) was to accentuate the
need to analyze the issue with models with a set of heterogenous individuals and
to propose a transparent theoretical model for MCF in such a setup. Christiansen
(1981) and Kaplow (1996) applied models with heterogenous individuals to the
conditions for the Samuelson Rule to be satisfied.
Despite the significant number of studies on the issue, there does not seem to
be convergence towards consensus with regard to the size of MCF. It seems likely
that countries with different tax levels and systems have different MCFs (Dahlby,
2008). However, this is not the only reason for the lack of convergence in the
literature. With more general models some contributions have indicated that MCF
is relatively high, see for example Dahlby and Ferede (2012), Browning (1976),
Browning (1987), Browning and Liu (1998), and Feldstein (1999). Also Kleven
and Kreiner (2006) found relatively high MCF estimates with a model with entry
and exit possibilities in the labour market. Others have argued that MCF is closer
to one, see for example Ballard (1990) and Stuart (1984). Theoretical contributions
from Christiansen (2007) and Kaplow (1998) draw in the same direction. Despite
the ambiguous conclusions in the literature, cost-benefit analyses of public projects
often assume that there are costs related to taxation and assume implicitly that the
conventional Samuelson Rule has to be corrected for that costs. Many countries
have as a general recommendation for cost-benefit analyses of tax-funded public
projects that the costs should be multiplied with a certain factor, for example 1.2,
to take MCF into account.
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Jacobs (2018) argues against this practise. He found that the standard defi-
nition of MCF has some ”undesirable” properties. Based on the critique of the
traditional approach, he argues that another definition of MCF should be applied.
With that approach, he found that MCF equals one in second best.1 An important
reason for this result is the assumption that the lump-sum tax is a marginal source
for public revenue in addition to income taxes or consumption taxes.2
Jacobs’ critique of the standard approach lists three undesirable properties of
the standard definition of MCF:
1. The standard measure of MCF of lump-sum taxes are different from one even
when taxes are optimized.
2. The standard measure of MCF is not directly related to the marginal excess
burden of taxation (MEB).
3. The standard measure of MCF is found to be sensitive to the choice of the
untaxed good with optimal taxation.
In addition, Jacob’s conclusion that MCF is one with optimal taxation is based
on the assumption that lump-sum-taxes could be a marginal source of public fund-
ing. This is in contrast to most earlier contributions, where the starting point for
the discussion has been that the possibilities for lump-sum taxation is limited and
therefore not should be considered as a marginal source of finance (Pigou, 1947;
Stiglitz & Dasgupta, 1971; Diamond & Mirrlees, 1971; Atkinson & Stern, 1974).
The present paper has two main elements. First, it responds in detail to the
third element of Jacobs’ critique of the standard definition of MCF; the claim that
the standard MCF-measure is sensitive to the choice of the untaxed good. My
starting point is that MCF is defined as the shadow price of the public budget
constraint divided by the average of the individuals’ marginal utility of income net
of taxes, see for example Sandmo (1998). With that definition the standard MCF-
measure is not sensitive to the choice of the untaxed good with optimal taxation.
I will show that the reason why Jaobs (2018) found that MCF is sensitive to the
1With a set of individual lump-sum taxes the optimal resource allocation (first best) could
be achieved.
2The proposed alternative definition of MCF was analyzed and discussed in H˚akonsen (1998)
who also studied other alternative representations of MCF.
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choice of the untaxed good was caused by a comparison of two different definitions
of MCF. In the case of an income tax, and the consumption tax normalized to zero,
MCF was defined as the shadow price of the public budget constraint divided by
the average of the individuals’ marginal utility of net income (after-tax income).
This is in accordance with most previous literature. However, in the case of a
consumption tax, and the income tax normalized to zero, MCF was implicitly
defined as the shadow price of the public budget constraint divided by the average
of the individuals’ marginal utility of gross income.
Next, I will show that the proposed alternative definition of MCF has some
undesirable properties which makes it less useful than the standard definition.
Hence, there are reasons to stick to the standard definition of MCF, which is not
one with optimal taxation and access to lump-sum taxes.
A numerical example illustrates the results. The concluding section includes
brief discussions of the two first elements of the critique of the standard MCF
measure.
2 Some properties of MCF with the standard
definition
Let there be a total of n individuals. Henceforth, it is understood that i refers
to one of the n individuals under consideration and the index i always runs from
i = 1, ..., n. With regard to model formulation and notation, I will, with a few
exceptions, follow Sandmo (1998).
The individuals’ utility functions are:
ui = u(ci, li, G), uc, ul, uG > 0, (1)
where ci is consumption of a private good, li is leisure and G is consumption of a
pure public good. Individuals maximize ui with respect to ci and li, taking G as
given, subject to the budget constraint:
(1 + τ)pcci = (1− t)wihi + a, (2)
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where hi is labour supply, τ is the consumption tax, t is the wage tax, wi is an
individual wage rate which reflects the individuals’ productivity, pc is producer
price of the consumption good, T is the endowment of time such that hi + li = T ,
and a is a uniform lump-sum transfer (positive, zero or negative). When a is
called a lump-sum tax, I have a negative value of a in mind. In the following the
consumer good price is normalized to one (pc = 1).
When formulating the maximization problem of the n individuals and the corre-
sponding Lagrange-function, one should have in mind that how individuals’ budget
constraint are included in the Lagrange function determines the interpretation of
the Lagrange multiplier and its size. The budget constraint is therefore normalized
as follows:
ci =
1− t
1 + τ
wihi +
a
1 + τ
. (3)
This is equivalent to
ci + pili = Mi, (4)
where pi is the price of leisure and Mi could be labeled the virtual income:
pi =
1− t
1 + τ
wi, (5)
Mi =
1− t
1 + τ
wiT +
a
1 + τ
. (6)
For later reference, define also the effective tax rate and effective lump-sum transfer
as:
t∗ =
t + τ
1 + τ
, (7)
a∗ =
a
1 + τ
. (8)
Obviously, any combined change of t, τ , and a that does not change either t∗ or
a∗ will not change behaviour of the individuals nor public revenue.
The Lagrange function related to the individuals’ utility maximization could
8
be written:
Li(ci, hi, G, wi, t, τ, a) = u(ci, T − hi, G)− λi
(
ci − 1− t
1 + τ
wihi − a
1 + τ
)
. (9)
First order conditions:
uc(ci, li, G) = λi, (10)
ul(ci, li, G) = −λi 1− t
1 + τ
wi. (11)
With the normalization of the budget constraint before inclusion in the Lagrange-
function, λi is equal to the marginal utility of consumption, or, in other words,
marginal utility of income net of taxes. This is essential because MCF will be
defined as the shadow cost of the public budget constraint divided by the average
of the n Lagrange-multipliers λi.
The two first order conditions in (10) and (11) together with the budget con-
straint (4) give individual Marshallian demand for consumer goods and leisure
together with labour supply as functions of pi and Mi:
ci = c(pi,Mi; G), (12)
li = l(pi,Mi; G), (13)
hi = T − l(pi,Mi; G) = h(pi,Mi; G). (14)
Let vi = v(t, τ, a, wi, G) be the indirect utility function. The envelope theorem
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gives that:
∂vi
∂t
= −λi 1
1 + τ
wihi, (15)
∂vi
∂τ
= −λi 1
1 + τ
ci, (16)
∂vi
∂a
= λi
1
1 + τ
, (17)
∂vi
∂G
=
∂ui
∂G
. (18)
The public budget constraint is:
τ
∑
i
ci + t
∑
i
wihi − na = qG, (19)
where q is the unit productions costs of the public good. The government maxi-
mizes the sum of the individuals’ utilities subject to the public budget constraint.
The corresponding Lagrange function is:
Lg =
∑
i
v(t, τ, a,G,wi) + μ
(
τ
∑
i
ci + t
∑
i
wihi − qG− na
)
. (20)
The first order conditions for the government’s maximization problem are:
1
1 + τ
∑
i
λi = μ
(
n− τ
∑
i
∂ci
∂a
− t
∑
i
wi
∂hi
∂a
)
, (21)
1
1 + τ
∑
i
λiwihi = μ
∑
i
(
τ
∂ci
∂t
+ wihi + twi
∂hi
∂t
)
, (22)
1
1 + τ
∑
i
λici = μ
∑
i
(
ci + τ
∂ci
∂τ
+ twi
∂hi
∂τ
)
, (23)
∑
i
∂ui
∂G
= μ
(
q − τ
∑
i
∂ci
∂G
− t
∑
i
wi
∂hi
∂G
)
. (24)
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The Lagrange multiplier μ is the shadow value of public consumption, which in
optimum should be equal to marginal costs of government expenditure financed
by taxes. Therefore μ is the starting point for definitions of MCF.
However, μ has to be normalized in some way or another. In models with a
single individual or a set of identical individuals, the marginal utility of income
(net of taxes) is an obvious choice for normalization, see for example H˚akonsen
(1998). With a set of heterogenous agents there is no such obvious way to normalize
μ. I follow Sandmo (1998) and define what could be considered as the standard
MCF-measure:
Definition 1 (The standard MCF) The marginal cost of public funds is de-
fined as
MCF =
μ
λˉ
, (25)
where λˉ is the average marginal utility of income net of taxes:
λˉ =
1
n
∑
i
λi. (26)
Throughout the paper bars indicate average values of variables. Define also λ =∑
i λi, yi = wihi, y =
∑
i yi, c =
∑
i ci, and public revenue as R = τ
∑
i ci +
t
∑
i yi − na. Moreover, throughout let εxz represent the elasticity of a variable x
with respect to a parameter z. Note also that it follows from the definition of a
covariance that:
cov(λi, yi) =
1
n
∑
i
λiyi − λˉyˉ. (27)
First consider the case where a lump-sum transfer is combined with an income
tax. Using the f.o.c. in (21) and (22) and assuming that τ = 0, we have:
MCFa =
1
1− t
n
∑
i wi
∂hi
∂a
, (28)
MCFt =
1− δλy
1− θt , (29)
where the subscript a and t indicate that MCF of a lump-sum tax and an income
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tax are considered, respectively, and where:
δλy = −cov(λi, yi)
λˉyˉ
, (30)
θt = −
∑
i
yi
y
εhit. (31)
where εhi t is the elasticity of individual i’s labour supply with respect to the tax
rate t.
Next, consider the case where a consumption tax is combined with a lump-sum
tax. Using the f.o.c. in (21) and (23) and assuming that t = 0, we have:
MCFa =
1
1 + τ
1
1− τ
n
∑
i
∂ci
∂a
, (32)
MCFτ =
1
1 + τ
1− δλc
1− θτ , (33)
where the subscript a and τ indicate that MCF of a lump-sum transfer and a
consumption tax are considered, respectively, and where
δλc = −cov(λi, ci)
λˉcˉ
, (34)
θτ = −
∑
i
ci
c
εciτ . (35)
where εci t is the elasticity of individual i’s consumption of the private good with
respect to the tax rate t.
Jacobs (2018) found that with his approach, standard MCF in second best was
less than one if the consumption tax was set to zero, and greater than one if the
income tax was set to zero. This is not the case with the setup in the present
paper:
Proposition 1 (MCF with optimal taxation) Assume that the government
implements a lump-sum tax in combination with either an income tax or a con-
sumption tax, in both cases such that second best is achieved. Then it follows from
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(28) and (32) that the size of MCF is less than one and not sensitive to whether
the solution is a result of a combination of a lump-sum tax and an income tax, or
a combination of a lump-sum tax and a consumption tax.
Proof. See appendix A.
The question is then why Jacobs (2018) found that with the standard definition
MCF is greater than one with an optimal combination of a consumption tax and
a lump-sum tax. This apparent shortcoming with the standard definition of MCF
followed from his interpretation of what exactly should be the standard definition.
In accordance with what is standard Jacobs defined MCF as the shadow price of the
public budget constraint normalized with the average of the shadow prices of the
individual budget constraints. This is apparently in accordance with Definition
1. However, there is an important difference. In construction of the Lagrange
function related to individual maximization Jacobs (2018) looked to the budget
constraint (2) and applied the Lagrange function:
Li
′(∙) = u(ci, T − hi, G)− λ′i ((1 + τ)ci − (1− t)wihi − a) , (36)
where λ′i is Lagrange-multiplier. This means that the f.o.c. in (10) now is replaced
with the following f.o.c.:
uc(ci, hi, G, wi)
1 + τ
= λ′i. (37)
It follows that the Lagrange-multiplier λ′i in the case with an income tax (and
τ = 0) is equal to the marginal utility of net income (after tax payment). In the
case with a consumption tax (and t = 0), λ′i is the marginal utility of gross income
(before tax payments). Because MCF is defined as μ/λˉ′, this means that we are
dealing with two different definitions of MCF, one in the case with an income tax
and another in the case with a consumption tax. This explains why MCFs are
found to be different in the two cases.
A key point here is that the size of λ′i varies with the size of the consumption tax
irrespective of whether the effective tax rate has changed. For example, consider
a situation where the three tax parameters t, τ and a are given values such that
the second best allocation is achieved. With this type of model and set of tax
parameters, the second best solution could be achieved with different combinations
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of the three tax parameters (Fullerton, 1997). However, irrespective of the choice
of tax parameters within the set of combinations, as long as second best is achieved,
MCF should be unaltered. This will be the case with the definition of MCF as
applied in this paper, where MCF = μ/λˉ. However, any change of τ will change
the size of λˉ′ also when it is combined with changes of t and a such that the
effective tax rates t∗ and a∗ are unaltered. This explains why Jacobs (2018) found
the standard MCF-measure to be sensitive to the choice of the untaxed good. This
is not an undesirable property with the standard MCF definition, but a weakness
with his definition of MCF. With the chosen formulation of the Lagrange-function
in Jacobs (2018), see (36), a better choice would have been to define MCF as
follows:
MCF =
1
1 + τ
μ
λˉ′
. (38)
Then MCF would not have been sensitive to the choice of the untaxed good.
The next section will analyze some properties of the MCF-definition preferred
by Jacobs (2018). In preparation for this, some corresponding properties of the
standard MCF-measure are analyzed in the following.
Because transfers received by individuals are not subject to income taxation,
while a consumption tax indirectly apply to transfers also, there will always be
an asymmetry with regard to the effects of increasing the income tax and the
consumption tax if a 6= 0. Hence, when a 6= 0 one cannot expect MCF to be
insensitive to the choice of the untaxed good.
With the assumption that a = 0 this is different. Then the effects of a con-
sumption tax and a labour tax are identical with respect to resource allocation
and income distribution, and therefore also welfare. It follows that costs related
to public funding are the same with the two tax instruments in this case. Thus,
if a = 0, MCF should be the same in these two cases also outside the second best
solution.3 Proposition 2 shows that this is the case with the standard definition of
MCF.
In preparation for Proposition 2, note that if a = 0 it follows from (29) and
3The term ’second best’ could here perhaps be confusing. Proposition 1 considers MCF in
second best assuming that a lump-sum tax could be implemented at the preferred level. If a
lump-sum tax for different reasons is not considered as an option, the second best solution will
be different from the one considered in Proposition 1.
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(33) that:
MCFt =
1− δλy
εRt
, (39)
MCFτ =
1
1 + τ
1− δλc
εRτ
, (40)
where εRt and εRτ are the elasticities of public revenue R with respect to the
income tax t and the consumption tax τ , respectively.
Proposition 2 (MCF without lump-sum taxes) Assume that a = 0. Let
MCFt˜ represent the standard measure of the marginal cost of public funds when
τ = 0 and t = t˜ ≥ 0. Correspondingly, let MCFτˆ represent the case where
τˆ = t˜/(1− t˜) and t = 0. Then we have that
MCFt˜ = MCFτˆ (41)
irrespective of whether the solution is second best.
Proof. See appendix A.
Proposition 2 shows a desirable property with the standard MCF-definition.
The expressions in (39) and (40) reveals other desirable properties. The Laffer-
curve is usually found to be concave (Trabandt & Uhlig, 2011). When approaching
the top of the Laffer-curve, increasing the tax rate further is by definition steadily
less effective with respect to revenue collection. Hence, when approaching the top
of the Laffer-curve it is desirable that an MCF-measure approaches infinity.
To check whether this is the case with the standard MCF-measure, consider
first the numerators of (39) and (40). If individual income yi is assumed to increase
with ability wi (agent monotonicity), then it is reasonable to assume that cov(λi, yi)
and cov(λi, ci) are both negative. Hence, the numerators of (39) and (40) are both
positive. With regard to the denominators, εRt and εRτ are the elasticities of the
revenue with respect to the tax rates. Consequently, with the standard definition,
MCF is positive along the entire upward sloping part of the Laffer-curve. As
the economy approaches the top of the Laffer-curve, εRt and εRτ converge towards
zero from above, which means that MCF approaches infinity. A numerical example
which illustrates this will be presented in Section 4.
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3 Some properties of MCF with the Diamond-
based definition
Due to the alleged undesirable properties with the standard MCF-measure, Jacobs
(2018) recommends another definition. In the following some properties of the
proposed MCF-measure is analyzed. Because H˚akonsen (1998) and Jacobs (2018)
are starting points for this, their setup for individuals’ utility maximization is
followed. They applied a Lagrange function corresponding to the formulation in
(36). The envelope theorem now gives that:
∂vi
∂a
= λ′i, (42)
∂vi
∂t
= −λ′iwihi, (43)
∂vi
∂τ
= −λ′ici. (44)
The public budget constraint is given by (19) and the Lagrange-function in (20)
is again applied for the government’s maximization problem. Using (42)-(44), the
first order conditions with respect to the three tax parameters then become:
μ
(
n− τ
∑
i
∂ci
∂a
− t
∑
i
wi
∂hi
∂a
)
=
∑
i
λ′i, (45)
μ
∑
i
(
τ
∂ci
∂t
+ wihi + twi
∂hi
∂t
)
=
∑
i
λ′iwihi, (46)
μ
∑
i
(
ci + τ
∂ci
∂τ
+ twi
∂hi
∂τ
)
=
∑
i
λ′ici. (47)
When the standard MCF-measure was defined in the previous section, I fol-
lowed Sandmo (1998) and normalized by dividing with the average marginal utility
of net income. H˚akonsen (1998) and Jacobs (2018) suggested to divide by the av-
erage social marginal value of income as defined by Diamond (1975):
Definition 2 (Diamond-based MCF) Based on Diamond (1975), define the
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social marginal value of income to individual i as:
αi = λ
′
i + μ
(
twi
∂hi
∂a
+ τ
∂ci
∂a
)
. (48)
The marginal cost of public funds in the following called the Diamond-based MCF-
measure is defined as
MCF D =
μ
αˉ
, (49)
where μ is the shadow value of the public budget constraint.
Here it should be noted that it reasonable to label λ′i = (1 + τ)
−1uc(ci, hi, G)
as the private marginal value of income, which is included as the first term on the
right hand side of (48). Note also that when MCF-measures in the remainder of
the paper have the superscript D, it refers to Diamond-based measures.
By plugging αi as defined in (48) into (46) and (47) we obtain the proposed
MCF-measures:
MCF Dt =
1− δαy
1 + εyt + ρy
, (50)
MCF Dτ =
1− δαc
1 + εcτ + ρc
, (51)
where
δαy = −cov(αi, yi)
αˉyˉ
, (52)
δαc = −cov(αi, yi)
αˉcˉ
, (53)
ρy = t
∑
i
yi
y
wi
∂hi
∂a
, (54)
ρc = τ
∑
i
ci
c
∂ci
∂a
. (55)
It should here be noted that the denominator in (50) could be written as in the
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following expression (see Appendix B):
MCF Dt =
1− δαy
1− θHt
(56)
where
θHt = −
∑
i
yi
y
εHhit (57)
and where εHhit is the elasticity of the Hicksian (compensated) labour supply with
respect to the tax rate. As pointed out by H˚akonsen (1998), this means that
the Diamond-based definition of MCF when τ = 0 is exactly the same defini-
tion that Ballard and Fullerton (1992) labeled the Pigou-Harberger-Browning ap-
proach, which depends heavily on the compensated labour supply elasticity.
With the assumption that a = 0, we could simplify (50) and (51) to:
MCF Dt =
1− δαy
εRt + ρy
, (58)
MCF Dτ =
1− δαc
εRτ + ρc
. (59)
First, consider (58). Because marginal utility of consumption is decreasing, it
is reasonable to assume that the cov(αi, yi) is negative. Hence, the numerator is
positive. The second term of the denominator, ρy, is negative because leisure is
assumed to be a normal good. This means that MCF Dt approaches infinity at a
level of t which is to the left of the top of the Laffer-curve. Furthermore, for tax
levels where 0 < εRt < −ρy, we have that MCF Dt is negative although we are still
along the upward sloping part of the Laffer-curve. Hence, for this set of tax levels
it is difficult to see that the Diamond-based definition of MCF of an income tax
provides any meaningful estimates of the costs of public funding.
Next consider (59), i.e. the case where t = 0 and a consumption tax is applied
instead. We still assume that the numerator is positive. The second term of
the denominator (ρc) is positive for obvious reasons. This means that MCF
D
τ
is positive along the entire upward sloping part of the Laffer-curve. Moreover,
MCF Dτ is positive also for tax levels where −ρy < εRτ < 0, which is along the
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downward sloping part of the Laffer-curve. This reveals that MCF Dτ could be
different from MCF Dt for the same effective tax rate t
∗ also when a = 0 . This
is an undesirable property of the Diamond base MCF-measure, because tax-based
funding of a public project in these two cases gives exactly the same values of
pi and Mi, and identical effects on all individuals’ private consumption, labour
supply, and utility. Hence, the MCF should have been identical in those two cases.
4 Numerical illustrations
To illustrate some of the results in the two preceding sections, a simulations of a
numerical model with 10 individuals were carried out. For detailed description of
the applied, model, see Appendix C. The utility functions were specified as CES-
functions that include private consumption, leisure, and public consumption. The
elasticity of substitution between leisure and private consumption was assumed to
be 1.25, which means that labour supply is upward sloping.
Assuming that the lump-sum transfer a could be set at any preferred level,
the second best solution is achieved with a lump-sum transfer a = −3.3 combined
with an income tax t = 0.25. A lump-sum transfer a = −4.4 combined with a
consumption tax τ = 0.33 will give the same effective tax rate and transfer, cf.
(7) and (8) and therefore also the same allocation of resources. With standard
definition MCF = 0.81 and the Diamond-based definition, MCF D = 1 in this
second best solution.
Simulations were also carried out when the lump-sum transfer were assumed
to be zero, see Figure 1. The horizontal axis measures public revenue as share of
total income, i.e. the effective tax rate, see (7). The left vertical axis measures
MCF while the right vertical axis measures total labour supply, welfare and public
revenue.
The Laffer-curve is blue and peaks at the point where the share of income
collected is equal to 0.85. The green curves represent the standard MCF-measure
with respect to both an income tax and a consumption tax. In accordance with the
results in section 2, the upper green curve increases towards infinity as we come
close to the top of the Laffer-curve from the left. At the top of the Laffer-curve
εRt = εRτ = 0. Thus, at this point the standard MCF-measure is not defined, see
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Figure 1: A numerical example with 10 individuals with different labour produc-
tivity factors. The horizontal axis measures the share of income collected by either
an income tax or a consumption tax. The blue curve shows the collected revenue
(the Laffer-curve). The red curve shows the aggregate utility of the consumers
(welfare). The purple curve shows labour supply. The green curve shows the
standard MCF-measure of both the consumption tax and the income tax. The
black and the yellow curves show MCF with the Diamond-based definition and an
income tax and a consumption tax, respectively. The dashed lines are asymptotes.
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(39) and (40). To the right hand side of the Laffer-curve maximum, both εRt and
εRτ are negative. Hence, the standard MCF-measures become negative as well,
see Figure 1.
The black curve represents the Diamond-based MCF-measure when an income
tax is applied. In accordance with results in section 3, this MCF-measure ap-
proaches infinity at a point to the left of the Laffer-curve maximum (when t
approaches 0.57 from below). Within the range where 0.57 5 t 5 0.85, which
belongs to the upward sloping part of the Laffer curve, the Diamond-based MCF
with respect to the income tax is negative.
The yellow curve represents the Diamond-based MCF-measure when a con-
sumption tax is applied. In accordance with the results in the previous section,
the yellow curve does not coincide with the black curve, representing the Diamond-
based MCF-measure with an income tax.
5 Discussion and conclusion
Jacobs (2018) found that the standard definition of MCF has some undesirable
properties. First, it was considered as a shortcoming that MCF of lump-sum taxes
are different from one even when they are optimized. Second, that MCF is not
directly related to the marginal excess burden of taxation (MEB). Third, that the
standard measure of MCF is found to be sensitive to the choice of the untaxed
good.
In accordance with the first element of the critique of the standard MCF,
the right hand side of (28) shows that if the income tax is positive, MCF of the
lump-sum tax is less than one. The reason is that the lump-sum tax has no
distortionary substitution effects, but has an income effect which draws in the
direction of increased labour supply. If there is a positive income tax, which has
caused an inefficiently low labour supply, increased labour supply represents an
efficiency gain. This is an essential point of both Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971)
and Atkinson and Stern (1974), and their critique of Pigou (1947). The same
arguments apply to a lump-sum tax combined with a consumption tax, cf. (32)
and Proposition 1. Hence, it might be argued that we are dealing with a strength
with the standard definition of MCF, not a shortcoming.
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With regard to the second element of the critique, that the standard MCF is not
directly related to MEB, Jacobs (2018) argues that Pigou (1947), Harberger (1964),
and Browning (1976) suggested such a relationship. It is outside the aspirations
of this paper to discuss this question thoroughly. At this point I simply refer to
the discussion in contributions such as Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), Atkinson and
Stern (1974) and Ballard and Fullerton (1992).
The present paper analyzes in more detail the question of whether the standard
MCF-measure is sensitive to the choice of the untaxed good. That result in Jacobs
(2018) was not confirmed. On the contrary, it was found that MCF is the same in
second best irrespective of the choice of the untaxed good. The reason was simply
that MCF in the present paper was defined as the shadow cost of the public
budget constraint divided by the average of the individuals’ marginal utility of
net-of-tax income. In the case with an income tax Jacobs (2018) applied the same
definition of MCF. However, his MCF of a consumption tax was implicitly defined
as the shadow price of the public budget constraint divided by the average of the
individuals’ marginal utility of gross income. This explains why he found that a
standard MCF-measure is sensitive to the choice of the untaxed good.
Because Jacobs (2018) found that the standard MCF-measure was undesirable,
another and less frequently used definition was suggested and applied. With this
definition the shadow price of the public budget constraint was normalized with
what Diamond (1975, p. 338) defined as the social marginal utility of private
income.
The present paper studied some properties of this alternative definition of MCF
in a case where the lump-sum transfer was set to zero. In that case public revenue
collection with a consumption tax has exactly the same effects on distribution and
resource allocation as revenue collection with an income tax. Hence, it would be
reasonable to expect that an MCF-measure in this case is insensitive to the choice
of the untaxed good also outside second-best optimum.
The present paper checked to what extent the two MCF-definitions passed this
test. The standard definition passed the test as MCF with this definition is not
influenced by the choice of the untaxed good also outside second best. In contrast,
with the Diamond-based MCF-measure the size of MCF is sensitive to the choice
of the untaxed good when we are no longer in second best.
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The present paper found other reasons why the standard definition of MCF
should be preferred to the Diamond-based definition. It was shown that with the
Diamond-based definition less meaningful MCF-estimates could be the result also
along the upward sloping part of the Laffer-curve.
Finally, Jacobs’ conclusion that the marginal cost of public funds is one is
based on an assumption that lump-sum-taxes could be a marginal source of public
funding. This is in contrast to most earlier contributions, where the starting point
for the discussion since the first contributions has been that the possibilities for
lump-sum taxation is limited and therefore not should be considered as a marginal
source of finance (Pigou, 1947; Stiglitz & Dasgupta, 1971; Diamond & Mirrlees,
1971; Atkinson & Stern, 1974). Jacobs agues that reducing for example tax credits
could have the properties of lump-sum taxation. However, it is not specified what
type of tax credits he has in mind. In practise it might be difficult to find good
examples of tax credits with pure lump-sum properties. Hence, in practise the
assumption that lump-sum taxation could be a marginal source for public funding
might be too optimistic.
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Appendices
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. First, assume that the second best allocation of
resources is achieved with a combination of a consumption tax τˆ and a lump-sum
transfer aˆ (while t = 0). Then an income tax t˜ = τˆ /(1 + τˆ) combined with a
lump-sum transfer a˜ = aˆ/(1 + τˆ) will also lead to be the second best allocation,
cf. (7) and (8).
In the case where t = 0, while τ = τˆ and a = aˆ we have from the budget
constraint (3) that
∂ci
∂aˆ
=
1
1 + τˆ
(
1 + wi
∂hi
∂aˆ
)
. (A.1)
Because a˜ = aˆ/(1 + τˆ), we have that
∂hi
∂aˆ
=
1
1 + τˆ
∂hi
∂a˜
. (A.2)
Plugging (A.2) into (A.1) gives that
∂ci
∂aˆ
=
1
1 + τˆ
(
1 + wi
1
1 + τˆ
∂hi
∂a˜
)
. (A.3)
Inserting into equation (32) gives that when t = 0 we have that
MCFa =
1
1− τˆ
1+τˆ
1
n
∑
i wi
∂hi
∂a˜
, (A.4)
which is equal to MCFa as defined in (28) if t = τˆ /(1 + τˆ) .
Because leisure is assumed to be a normal good, ∂hi/∂a < 0. Then it follows
from (A.4) that MCF ≤ 1 irrespective of case considered.
Proof of Proposition 2. This proposition claims that if if a = 0 and τ =
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t/(1− t), then MCFt = MCFτ . This is true only if
1− δλy
εRt˜
=
1− δλc
(1 + τˆ)εRτˆ
, (A.5)
cf. (39) and (40).
First, define:
m =
1− t
1 + τ
. (A.6)
When a = 0, pi = mwi and Mi = mwiT . Then we have from (14) that y =∑
i wihi(mwi,mwiT ). We could then define the function
y = y(m,w1, ...., wn). (A.7)
Starting with the denominator of the l.h.s. of equation (A.5) and the case where
a = τ = 0, then R = ty and it follows that
∂R
∂t
= y +
∂y
∂m
∂m
∂t
= y − t ∂y
∂m
. (A.8)
Thus, the denominator of the l.h.s. of equation (A.5) could be written as follows:
εRt = 1− t
y
∂y
∂m
. (A.9)
Next, consider the denominator of the r.h.s. of equation (A.5) and the case where
a = t = 0. Then we have that
R = τc =
τ
1 + τ
y. (A.10)
We have that
∂y
∂τ
=
∂y
∂m
∂m
∂τ
= − ∂y
∂m
1
(1 + τ)2
, (A.11)
and it follows that
∂R
∂τ
=
1
(1 + τ)2
y − τ
(1 + τ)3
∂y
∂m
. (A.12)
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Thus, we have that
(1 + τ)εRτ =
(
1− τ
1 + τ
1
y
∂y
∂m
)
. (A.13)
Taking into account that τ = t/(1− t) and (A.9), it follows that the denominator
of the l.h.s is equal to the denominator of the r.h.s. of equation (A.5).
Finally, consider the numerators of of equation (A.5). It follows that when
a = 0, then ci = myi and
cov(λi, ci) = m∙cov(λi, yi). (A.14)
This means that δλy = δλc if a = 0, cf. (30) and (34). Hence, the numerator of the
l.h.s. is equal to the numerator of the r.h.s. of equation (A.5).
B The relationship between the Diamond-based
MCF-measure and the PHB-tradition.
The Marshallian demand for leisure and supply of labour were defined in (13)
and (14), respectively. Let lHi = l
H
i (pi, ui) and h
H
i = h
H
i (pi, ui) be the corre-
sponding Hicksian demand for leisure and supply of labour, respectively. The
Slutsky-equation gives that
∂li
∂pi
=
∂lHi
∂pi
− li ∂li
∂Mi
, (B.1)
which means that:
∂hHi
∂pi
=
∂hi
∂pi
+ (T − hi)∂hi
∂a
. (B.2)
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Assuming that τ = 0, we have that
∂hi
∂t
=
∂hi
∂pi
∂pi
∂t
+
∂hi
∂Mi
∂Mi
∂t
(B.3)
= −wi ∂hi
∂pi
− ∂hi
∂a
wiT, (B.4)
∂hHi
∂t
= −wi ∂h
H
i
∂pi
(B.5)
It follows that:
∂hi
∂pi
= − 1
wi
∂hi
∂t
− ∂hi
∂a
T, (B.6)
∂hHi
∂pi
= − 1
wi
∂hHi
∂t
(B.7)
Plugging into (B.2) gives that:
∂hHi
∂t
=
∂hi
∂t
+ wihi
∂hi
∂a
. (B.8)
Equation (50) could be rewritten to:
MCF Dt =
1− δαy
1 + t
y
∑
i wi
(
∂hi
∂t
+ yi
∂hi
∂a
) . (B.9)
(56) then follows from (B.8) and (B.9).
C Description of the model used in the numeri-
cal example
In the numerical model used for illustrative purposes in section 4, there are n = 10
individuals with the following utility function:
ui = x
(
α1−ρcρi + β
1−ρlρi + γ
1−ρGρ
) 1
ρ (C.1)
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Figure 2: Wage rates wi and gross and net incomes in second best, for i = 1, ..., 10.
where x, α, β, γ, and ρ are parameters. Define
s =
1
1− ρ. (C.2)
s is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure and was set
to 1.25. The parameters α and β where calibrated such that α1−ρ = 0.3 and
β1−ρ = 0.7.
The wage rates were determined such that:
w1 = 1 (C.3)
wi = (wi−1)g if i > 1, (C.4)
were g is a parameter which was calibrated to a value that gave a Gini-index of
gross income distribution of 27.5 in second best. Both the individual wage rates
and individual before and after tax incomes in second best are shown in Figure 2.
The complete list of applied parameter values follows:
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
x 0.25 γ 0.10
α 0.22 β 0.64
ρ 0.20 s 1.25
T 24.00 g 1.03
Second best was achieved with an effective tax rate t∗ = 0.25 combined with an
effective lump-sum transfer a∗ = −3.30. Individuals spent between 8.4 and 9.2
time units working of total time endowments of T = 24 time units. An effective
level t∗ = 0.41 gave welfare maximum if the lump-sum transfer was set to zero.
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